Identity-based mutual authentication and key agreement (ID-MAKA) between a mobile user and cloud service provider is necessary for accessing any cloud services. In recent years, there are a large number of ID-MAKA schemes had been proposed on mobile cloud computing services to make authentication and accessing process more usability, security, and scalability. In this paper, we propose a new ID-MAKA scheme for mobile cloud computing, which firstly achieves remote biometric-based authentication(remote servers authenticate user's biometrics), single sign-on (a single credential and single registration for accessing multiple servers) and center-less authentication(the registration center does not participate in the access procedure) in one scheme. In order to realize this target, we design a ZK-token based on ECC and cryptographic hash function, and then artfully employ it to introduce the fuzzy extractor technology and zero-knowledge technology into our scheme. Therefore, the user can access multiple cloud computing servers by registering only once in the registration center, and cloud computing servers can complete the biometric-based remote authentication and key agreement for the user without the registration center participating. In this way, our scheme greatly improves usability, scalability, and security compared to other existing solutions. We give a formal security proof for our scheme by using Real-Or-Random(RoR) model and Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic to show that the present scheme is secure and security analysis for other known attacks. Finally, according to the experiment result, our scheme has lower computation and communication cost compared with most existing related schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile cloud computing (MCC) provides cloud resources on demand by integrating cloud computing into the mobile environment. In order to access mobile cloud computing services, identity-based mutual authentication and key agreement (ID-MAKA 1 ) is required between the user and the cloud service provider. In the last decade of research, privacy-preserving remote biometric-based The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Guanding Yu . 1 The server authenticates the real identity of the user while the user authenticates the identity of the server, and then both parties conduct key agreement. authentication(remote servers authenticate user's biometrics), single sign-on(a single credential and single registration for accessing multiple servers) and center-less authentication(the registration center does not participate in the access procedure) are three functions that people are working on for ID-MAKA scheme in the mobile cloud computing environment.
With the improvement of mobile phone hardware, biometrics such as the fingerprint and the face are gradually used in identity authentication. Compared with passwords, biometric keys have many advantages in practicability and security since it is difficult to lose, forget, copy, forge, guess and break. The biometric-based authentication is widely used in many research fields, such as mobile payment, intelligent lock, and access control system. However, different 2 from these areas, the cloud service prefers to remotely authenticate the user's identity rather than trust the biometrics authentication result from the user's mobile device. In this way, the server can authenticate a user's real identity, not just authenticates the private key stored at the mobile device.
In essence, mobile cloud computing services are quite distributed and heterogeneous. Traditional two-party single server authentication scheme cannot be directly applicable for a multiple mobile cloud servers environment since registering separately for each cloud service provider by maintaining respective user account is very difficult and inconvenient. Therefore, people in both industry and academic areas hope that the ID-MAKA scheme can achieve single sign-on (SSO) which only require single credential and single registration for accessing multiple mobiles could computing services.
Moreover, people want to reduce the participation of the registration center(RC), which we called center-less, due to the following two problems: First, over the involvement of RC might turn into a communication bottleneck for the scheme. Second, the RC database stores a large amount of sensitive information, which, once it leaks, will cause serious security problems.
A. RELATED WORK
In the research results in recent years, people gradually achieve these functions in ID-MAMA schemes for mobile computing environment:
Biometric-based and SSO ID-MAKA scheme: Yoon et al. [4] first proposed an efficient and secure biometric-based multi-server mutual authentication with key agreement scheme on elliptic curve cryptosystem among all users which fits multi-server communication environments. His scheme hasn't verification table at the registration center and minimizes the complexity of hash operation among all users. But it needs to send biometric information to the RC during the registration phase. Kim et al. [23] found that Yoon's scheme cannot withstand the offline password guessing attack when the certificate is lost and proposed an improved scheme without these weaknesses. Then, He [25] pointed out that Yoon's and Kim 's scheme is vulnerable to the privileged insider attack and the impersonation attack. He et al. [6] propose a new scheme based on fuzzy extractor for remote authentication of biometrics which can overcome the weaknesses in Yoon et al. [4] and Kim et al. [23] scheme. Odelu et al. [1] proposes a novel and secure biometrics-based multi-server authentication mechanism using ECC for the battery-limited devices which supports the efficiently password change and provide high security along with a variety of features as compared to He et al. [6] scheme. In all of the above schemes, their mutual authentication and key agreement phase require the participation of the registration center.
SSO and center-less ID-MAKA scheme: In 2015, Tsai et al. [2] proposed a scheme to exclude the necessity for the trusted third party to be involved in regular user authentication session such that the total user authentication processing time can be reduced. But Jiang et al. [26] points out that Tsai et al. [2] scheme is vulnerable to the service provider impersonation attack and has no user revocation facility when the mobile device is lost/stolen. After that, Odelu et al. [27] proposed a scheme which provides more security functionalities, including SK-security and strong credentials' privacy, along with low computational overheads for mobile users. In 2016, Tseng et al. [3] concerns and improves the Tsai's scheme and with the revocation problem to offer an efficient revocation mechanism without maintaining black/white lists while retaining performance. Although Tsai et al. [2] , Tseng et al. [3] and Odelu et al. [27] schemes are very useful for distributed multi-server environment, none of them has the scalability of remote biometrics authentication.
Biometric-based, center-less and SSO ID-MAKA scheme: In 2017, Roy et al. [7] proposed a scheme which achieves biometrics-based authentication without registration center participate for multi-server environment. However, the method he uses does need registration center, cloud computing servers, and mobile terminal of users to store large numbers of credentials. Each entity's database needs to be synchronized in time when a user or cloud server is registered. Even more, its security depends on the hash function rather the existing hard problem.
B. MOTIVATION
According to the related work, there is no center-less single sign-on with privacy-preserving remote biometric-based ID-MAKA scheme for mobile cloud computing services. If we can design such scheme, users can access multiple services with only one registration. The registration center and cloud server do not need to store any information about the user. Each time the user logs in, the cloud server can remotely complete the user's biometric identification and use it to execute the key agreement. It significantly improves usability, scalability, and security compared to other related schemes.
Aiming for this target, we introduce technologies including zero-knowledge proof, ECC, cryptographic hash function, and fuzzy extractor. But we are not merely giving a great combination of these technologies. A zero-knowledge proof enables a prover to convince a verifier that some statement is true, but the verifier learns nothing except the validity of the statement. Fuzzy extractor technology can symbolize user biometrics. ECC achieve the same security with a smaller key size compared with traditional public-key cryptosystem. Therefore, we design a ZK-token based on ECC and cryptographic hash function, and then artfully employ it to biometric authentication through fuzzy extractor technology and zero-knowledge technology into the scheme by it. ZK-tokens do not work the same as traditional credentials.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Compared with the existing scheme, our scheme firstly achieves remote biometrics-based multi-factor authentication scheme with center-less single sign-on. Specifically, our contributions are listed as below: 1) To achieve the privacy-preserving remote biometrics authentication scheme, we design a token, which we called ZK-Token and contains public parameter information. By use of zero-knowledge proof interaction protocol and fuzzy extractor, the ZK-token can help the authentication server and user completing the mutual authentication and key agreement phase and revealing nothing sensitive information. 2) To achieve SSO, we put the information which helps to complete the mutual authentication and key agreement phase stored at ZK-Token rather than by cloud service providers. To access the servers, the users need to transfer his ZK-Token to the registry cloud server providers and prove that he knows or owns a secret which only the applicant of token knows. 3) To achieve center-less, registration center does not store any sensitive data of users and cloud service providers. Different from other existing schemes, RC's main responsibility is to issue ZK-Token and guarantee that it cannot be modified and forged by the adversary. 4) Our scheme has a low computational overhead of the mobile terminal and the cloud server. In the entire login, authentication and key agreement process, the mobile terminal only performs 1 fuzzy extractor operation, 3 elliptic curve point multiplications and 4 hash functions which save the half time of Tseng et al. [3] . Not only that, but the computational overhead on the server is also lower than the scheme of Tseng et al. [3] and Tsai et al. [2] . In terms of security, our scheme is to rely on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and zero-knowledge proof.
D. PAPER ORGANIZATION
Section II presents the system model. Section III provides the mathematical preliminaries in brief, which are necessary to describe and analyze the proposed scheme. Section IV presents the proposed scheme. Section V provides the detailed formal and informal security analysis of the proposed scheme, while Section VI presents the performance comparison of the proposed scheme with other related existing schemes. At last, Section VII provides the conclusion of the paper and proposes the direction of future research. The table below shows the list of acronyms used in this paper. Fig 1 shows the system model of the desirable scheme for the cloud computing environment. Three parties take part in the proposed scheme: mobile cloud users, mobile cloud service providers, and a registration center. Please note that the trusted third party used in our scheme is named TSP instead of the traditional SCG or RC since our issued tokens are more widely used and do not work the same as traditional credentials. We assume that there are many mobile users and service providers within the mobile cloud services environment, and a small portion of these mobile users and service providers are malicious. Mobile cloud users, cloud service providers, and the token service provider are denoted by U = {U i |i = 1, . . . , n}, CSP = {CSP j |j = 1, . . . , m}, and TSP. Fig. 1 illustrates the proposed system architecture: A user can access multiple mobile cloud computing services from different service providers without the involvement of the TSP. The TSP is in charge of generating token and issuing public parameters.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we follow the well-know DolevYao et al. [28] threat model (DY model) in our scheme, which accepts the following underlying assumptions:
• Messages are communicated over a insecure public channel.
• Public channel messages are susceptible to eavesdropping, deletion, or modification, which are executed by adversary A.
• If the adversary A obtains legal user's mobile terminal, he can execute a power analysis attack and extract all stored information from the device.
III. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
To design the proposed scheme, we need to use zeroknowledge proof, fuzzy extractor technique, and elliptic curve cryptosystem. This section presents a brief introduction about these mathematical preliminaries.
A. ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS OF KNOWLEDGE
A zero-knowledge proof [9] enables a prover (P) to convince a verifier (V) that some statement is true, but the verifier learns nothing except the validity of the statement. In the following, we review a simple but powerful zero-knowledge proof of discrete logarithm instantiation introduced by Schnorr in his identification scheme [9] , which plays an important role in our scheme. This zero-knowledge proof of knowledge allows P to prove the knowledge of
Challenge: V selects a random c ∈ {0, 1} λ and sends c back to P.
Response: P computes z = ρ − cx(mod p) and returns z to V .
Verify: V accepts the proof if and only if T = y c g z .
B. FUZZY EXTRACTOR OF BIOMETRICS
The fuzzy extractor uses a biometric feature input B from the user and uses the probabilistic generation function in a permissible error-tolerant manner to generate the unique random string θ and the auxiliary string σ . Then it uses a deterministic reproduction procedure to produce the same original string θ through input the auxiliary string σ , and a noisy user biometric B * which differs from the original biometric B up to a threshold value [1] . We call (ϒ, m, l, t, ) a fussy extractor [10] :
distance function that calculates the similarity between two different biometric input B and B * ;
• m is the min-entropy of any distribution W on metric ϒ; • l is the length of θ;
• t is the error tolerance threshold;
• is the statistical distance between two given probability distributions θ, σ and U l , σ , where U l denotes the uniform distribution on l-bit binary string;
• In general, a fuzzy extractor exploits two functions: 1) Gen(Âů) and 2) Rep(Âů), which are probabilistic and deterministic in nature, respectively;
• Gen: (θ, σ ) = Gen(B). It takes B ∈ ϒ as input and produces a pair (θ, σ ), where θ as the biometric key and σ is like the public reproduction parameter;
• Rep : θ = Rep(B * , σ ). It recovers the original θ on biometrics B * provided that the Hamming distance between B * and the original biometrics B at the time of registration by the same user is less than or equal to t. In recent years, fuzzy extractor becomes a key technology for biometric-based authentication. It is applied for biometric authentication in several authentication protocols Roy et al. [11] , Waid et al. [13] , [14] .
C. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM (ECC)
Compared with traditional public-key cryptosystem, the ECC offers better performance because it can achieve the same security with a smaller key size. Thus, ECC-based authentication schemes are more suitable for mobile devices than traditional PKC-based ones.
Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)): Computing Q = kP is relatively easy for given k ∈ F p and P ∈ E p . However, given P ∈ E p and Q ∈ E p , it is computationally hard to compute the scalar k such that Q = kP.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem): Given three points P, sP, and tP over Ep(a, b) for s, t ∈ F p , the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) is to find the point stP over Ep(a, b).
Definition 3 (Elliptic Curve Factorization Problem): Given two points P and Q = sP + tP over E p (a, b) for s, t ∈ F p , the elliptic curve factorization problem (ECFP) is to find two points sP and tP over E p (a, b).
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The proposed scheme is based on the basic assumption that the distributed mobile cloud computing environment has three basic entities: 1) mobile cloud users (U); 2) cloud service providers (CSP); 3) token service provider(TSP).
The system contains a set of m legal mobile cloud users, M = {U i |i = 1, 2, . . . , m}, a set of n cloud servers, N = {CSPj|j = 1, 2, . . . , n} and the trusted TSP. The authentication factors used in our scheme are: 1) Identity ID i of a user
The proposed scheme is composed of three phases: 1) registration; 2) login, authentication and key agreement;
3) revocation and reissue. The registration phase is composed of mobile cloud users registration phase and cloud service providers registration phase. During the registration phase, mobile cloud users and cloud service providers register to the TSP independently. The TSP generates the ZK-token for the registered servers and users. In the login, authentication and key agreement phase, the CSP first receives the user's ZK-token and verifies its authenticity. And then, the mobile user and cloud server authenticate each other and generate the secret shared session key. The revocation and reissue phase gives the flexibility for the user to update validate factors into a new password or new personal biometric characteristics for secure reasons.
A legal user or an unregistered external person may execute malicious activities in the system, called as an adversary A. A mobile user can access multiple cloud service providers, and the TSP does not need to participant in the login, authentication and key agreement processes.
The necessary notations list in Table 1 are used to design the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme makes use of the current system timestamps along with the random nonces to protect strong replay attacks. To achieve this goal, we assume that all the entities (mobile cloud users, cloud service providers, and the TSP) in the network are synchronized with their clocks. This is a reasonable assumption as it is also applied in designing many authentication protocols proposed recently.
A. SYSTEM SETUP Initially, the token service provider TSP selects a non-singular elliptic curve E p over a finite filed GF(p). Q ∈ G is the generate point, where p is a large prime and G is an additive cyclic group of order p consisting of points on E p . H (·) :
{0, 1} * → Z * p is a hash function; x ∈ Z * p is the secret key; PK = −xQ is the public key. The common reference string is (p, Q, PK , H (·))
B. REGISTRATION PHASE
To access CSP j , the U i needs to register at the TSP via a secure channel. In this phase, a user U i sends a request and obtains the ZK-Token from the TSP i with authentication parameter as follows( Table 2) :
Step 1 the U i first chooses his own identity ID i , personal password PW i and imprints his biometric B i ;
Step 2 Mobile terminal (MT i ) of user produces (θ i , σ i ) = Generation(B i ) and computes Q i = −s 1 Q, s 1 = H (ID i ||PW i ||θ i ||T ), T is a period of time. U i then submits the registration request message < ID i , Q i > to the TSP via secure channel;
Step 3 TSP picks a random r i ∈ Z * p , and computes
Step 4 U i stores
2, Registration phase of the cloud server provider Fig 3 shows the registration phase of cloud service providers.
In this phase, a cloud service provider CSP j sends a request and obtains the ZK-Token from the TSP i with authentication parameter as follows (Table 3) :
Step 1 CSP j first chooses his own identity ID S j and select a secret sk j ∈ Z * p ;
Step 2 CSP j computes s j = H (ID i ||sk j ||T ), Q j = −s j Q. CSP j then submits the registration request message < ID S j , Q j > to the TSP via secure channel; Step 3 TSP picks a random r j ∈ Z * p , and compute e j = H (ID S j ||Q j ||r j Q|T ||ID tsp ), k j = (r j − xe j )modp. TSP send TK j =< ID S j , Q j , k j Q, e j , e j PK , ID tsp > back to CSP j ;
Step 4 CSP j stores TK * j = {TK j , sk j }. In this phase, CSP j receives the login request message from U i and two entities mutually authenticate each other. After successful mutual authentication, U i and CSP j establish a common secret session key K ij which is used for future secure communications between them. The following steps are needed in this phase (Table 4 ).
Step 1: U i inputs his identity ID i , password PW i and personal biometrics B i into his own mobile terminal MT i . MT i use the fuzzy extractor reproduction procedure and stored σ i to compute θ = Reproduction(B i , σ i ) and s 1 = H (ID||PW i ||θ i ||T );
Step 2: U i selects a random r 1 ∈ Z * p , computes R 1 = r 1 Q and sends TK i , R 1 to the CSP j ;
Step 3: CSP j verifies if e i = H (Q 1 ||ID i ||ID tsp ||k i Q + e i PK ||T )? If not, CSP j terminates the phase. Then CSP j selects two random numbers w, r 2 ∈ Z * p , computes
, and sends TK j , R 2 = r 2 Q, K * ij ⊕ (w||H (K * ij )) back to the U i ; Step 4: U i computes K ij = H (s i Q j ||r 1 R 2 ||ID i ||ID S j ), y 1 = (−s 1 w + r 1 )modp sequentially; U i verifies if e j = H (Q j ||k j Q + e j PK ||T ||ID tsp ||ID S j ) and H (K ij ) = H (K * ij ). If not, U i terminates the phase, else, U i sends K ij ⊕ y 1 to the CSP j ;
Step 5: The CSP j computes y 1 = K * ij ⊕ K ij ⊕ y 1 , and authenticates U i by checking whether the equality R 1 = y 1 Q+wQ 1 . If not, CSP j terminates the phase, else, the process is complete.
D. REVOCATION AND REISSUE
The client and server time update tokens will not be available after the time expires and the token needs to be reissued by the token service provider. For client and cloud server providers, the process of updating tokens is the same as applying for tokens.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide formal security analysis using Real-Or-Random(RoR) model and BAN Logic proof for the proposed scheme. Moreover, this section also puts forward discussions on how the proposed scheme resists various other security attacks.
A. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING REAL-OR-RANDOM MODEL
In this subsection, we give a formal analysis for our proposed scheme by unsing the Real-Or-Random model [7] , [8] . We assure that an adversary A can make several queries on each different oracle, which simulate the real attack on the challenge scheme C. We present these different oracle queries as follows:
• Send(C, m) : A sends a request message m to C, and C replies to A in terms of the rules of the scheme.
• Execute(C, S) : Through this query, A can eavesdrops a message m communicated between U i and S in actual execution of the scheme.
• Revel(C) : Revel query reveals the current session key K ij generated by C to A. • Test(C) : C returns a string s to A according to the output of an unbiased flipped coin b. If b = 1, C returns current computed session key K ij as the string. If b = 0, C returns a random string. This query can be invoked only once, and a null value will be returned to A when there is no session key is generated. Definition 7 (Freshness): C is defined to be fresh, if it met the following conditions simultaneously: 1) C is in accept state, 2) Reveal(C) query has never been submitted, and 3) less than two Corrup(U i , a) has been submitted.
Definition 8: Adv ECDLP
A (t A ) ≤ , > 0 and sufficiently small. The advantage probability of ECDLP is negligible for adversary A with execution time t A .
Theorem 1: Let A be a polynomial time bounded adversary running with time upper bound A. In order to break the semantic security security of the proposed scheme, A makes H hash oracle queries, Send query and Execute query at most q H , q s , and q e times. Then we have
where l r is the string length of random number, l H are the string length of hash results, respectively, ε bm is the probability of false positive [31] , D is a finite dictionary with size |D|, Adv ID−MAKA C and Adv ECDLP A (t A ) are defined in Definition 3 and 5, respectively.
Proof: Game G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , G 4 and G 5 are a set of games. Let Succ i be an event defined as successful guessing bit b in Test query by an adversary A in the game G i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
G 0 : We assume the starting game and the real scheme in random oracles are to be identical and have
(2) G 1 : In this game, Reveal, Execute, Corrupt, Test, H and Send queries are simulated and described in Table 5 . G 1 create three lists: (1) L H answers hash oracles of H ; (2) L A stores random oracle queries, and (3) list L T records transcripts between U i and S. We have
due to indistinguishability of games G 0 and G 1 . G 2 : we consider the collision situation with random numbers and hash results in the transcripts of M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 in this game. The H query has at most collision probability as q H 2 l H . The process of login, authentication and key agreement contain specific random number r 1 , w, and r 2 . The most probability of collision for these numbers are ( (q s +q e ) 3 2 lr +2 ). Hence, we have
G 3 : In this game, A tries to guess the correct message without active participation of hash oracles. Hence, we consider the following three cases. C 1 : First, we consider Send(S, M 1 ) query. The maximum calculated probability of hash value H (ID i ||PW i ||θ i ||T ) are q H 2 l H . Finally, for the random number r 1 , we have the maximum probability for this as q s 2 lr . C 2 : Then, we consider Send(U i , M 2 ). The maximum calculated probability of hash value
For the random number w and r 2 , we get it maximum probability q s 2 lr and q s 2 lr , respectively. According to the results of each game G i , i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, we have:
Hence, we can obtain the required result:
Therefore, theorem is proved.
B. AUTHENTICATION PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
BAN logic is used to mutual authentication between two communicating parties in a network [17] . We can use it to show the proposed scheme achieves authentication goals G1 and G2 discussed below. The basic BAN logic notations and their meanings are as follows:
• P |≡ X : P believes that the statement X is true; • P X : P can see the statement X;
• #(X ) : Formula X is considered as fresh;
• P ⇒ X : P keeps jurisdiction over the statement X;
• P |∼ X : P once said the statement X; • X K : X encrypted under the key K; • X Y : Formula X is combined with the formula Y;
• P K ← → Q : Only P and Q know the key K, and they use it for their communication.
• P X Q : X is a secret known only to P and Q, and possibly to principals trusted by them.
The main laws of the BAN logic are listed below: law 1 (Message meaning law):
That is if P believes that the key K is shared with Q and sees X encrypted under K, then P believes that Q once said X. law 2 (Nonce verification law):
That is, if P believes that X could have been said only recently and that Q once said X. law 3 (Jurisdiction law):
That is, if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X, then P trusts Q on the truth of X law 4 (Freshness conjuncatenation law):
That is, if X is fresh, then the (X,Y) must be also fresh law 5 (Additional laws):
To complete the authentication proof, the proposed scheme must satisfy the following test goals in order to prove the system is secure:
Generic form: The generic form of our scheme is given below:
{ID S j , Q j , k j Q, e j , e j P, ID tsp , K ij ⊕ w H K ij , R 2 }. The arrangement of the above generic message to the idealized form is as follows:
{ ID S j , Q j , k j Q, e j , R 2 , e j P, ID tsp PK , H K ij , w K ij }. The following basic assumptions of the authentication proof :
To achieve the goal G 1 and goal G 2 , the main proofs are stated as follows:
From message 1, we have,
According to the law AL, we obtain, CSP j
According to 6 and MML, we obtain,
S 4 : According to 3 and FCL, we obtain, CSP j |≡ #(Q i , ID i , R 1 ).
S 5 : According to NVL, we have, CSP j |≡ U i |≡ (Q i , ID i , R 1 ). S 6 : Using 7 and JL, we get, CSP j |≡ (Q i , ID i , R 1 ) S 7 : From S 6 and AL, we obtain, CSP j |≡ Q i , CSP j |≡ ID i , CSP j |≡ R 1 , S 8 : According to 10, 11, 15, we get, CSP j |≡ s j , CSP j |≡ ID S j , CSP j |≡ r 2 . S 9 : Since K ij = H (s j Q i ||r 2 R 1 ||ID i ||ID S j ) and the results in Steps S 7 and S 8 give CSP j |≡ (U i K ij ←→ CSP j ) (G 1 ) S 10 : Using the message 2 and AL, we obtain, U i { ID S j , Q j , R 2 PK }. S 11 : According to 5 and MML, we obtain, U i |≡ CSP j |∼ (ID S j , Q j , R 2 ). S 12 : According to 4 and FCL, we obtain, U i |≡ #(ID S j , Q j , R 2 ).
S 13 : According to NVL, we have, U i |≡ CSP j |≡ (ID S j , Q j , R 2 ). ←→ CSP j ) As a result, (G 1 ) and (G 2 ) ensure that both U i and CSP j mutually authenticate each other.
C. DISCUSSION ON OTHER ATTACKS
In this section, we also informally analyze the security of the proposed scheme to show that it can defend against other attacks.
1) STOLEN/LOST MOBILE DEVICE ATTACK
In our scheme, the mobile terminal does not store any sensitive information. Even if an attacker entirely obtains the data stored in the mobile terminal, they still cannot pass the authentication of the cloud service provider.
2) REPLAY ATTACK
Suppose an adversary A intercepts the message M 1 = TK 1 , R 1 , and replies this message to the server CSP j . However, the adversary A cannot computes the valid K ij = H (s i Q j ||r 1 R 2 ||ID i ||ID S j ) without PW i , B 1 and r 1 . Therefore, the A cannot succeed by replying with the intercepted message M 1 . Similarly, when M 2 and M 3 are intercepted, a replay attack also cannot success to attack the proposed scheme. Hence, our scheme protects from the replay attack.
3) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
Our schemes uses ECC, hash function, random nonce and bitwise XOR operation in both message M 1 , M 2 and M 3 . However, adversary A can not modify the message to pass the authentication process as these need the secret key of TSP or the privacy information provided by users and cloud service providers. This causes the proposed scheme to resist the manin-the-middle attack.
4) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
Due to the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem, inverting one-way hash function H (Âů) and guessing biometrics B i of the user U i , It is computationally hard for the insider of TSP to derive the password PW i or B i .
5) KNOWN SESSION KEY SECRECY
According to the proposed scheme, the session key is mutually computed as K * ij = H (s j Q i ||r 2 R 1 ||ID i ||ID S j ). Due to the use of r 1 and r 2 , for every new login session, K ij is generated in random but in a unique way. Therefore, the disclosure of the current session key does not provide crucial information to the adversary that helps him to compute previous session keys.
6) SESSION KEY SECURITY
To establish the session key, both U i and CS j need mutually authenticate each other. Furthermore, to derive the session key, an attacker need to have the PW i , B i , sk j . Hence, the session key is secure.
7) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
An adversary A must obtain the PIN code PW i and biometric B i of U to authenticate at the CSP j and establishes a session VOLUME 7, 2019 key. Thus, our scheme has the ability to prevent the impersonation attack.
8) SERVER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
It requires the server secret key sk j for the adversary to conduct a server impersonation attack. As a consequence, the proposed scheme also resists server impersonation attack.
9) EPHEMERAL SECRET KEY LEAKAGE ATTACK
Under this attack, the exposer of temporary secrets of a session may harm the secrecy of a session key. In the proposed scheme, the session key is computed as K ij = H (s i Q j ||r 1 R 2 ||ID i ||ID S j ), the adversary A cannot computes K ij as it also depends on the PIN code PW i and the biometric B i .
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we give the comparison of previous proposed ID-MAKA schemes designed for mobile cloud computing services [1] - [3] , [5] , [7] . Table 6 shows a detailed comparison on various security attacks and functions. Compared with the existing related scheme, it is observed that our scheme gives the support of much more functionality and overcomes more security weakness.
A. COMPARISON ON SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY
B. COMPARISON ON COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COSTS
In this paper, we consider Xiaomi 6 mobile phone for user side computation and Intel i7 4770hq computer for cloud service provider side computation, respectively. Xiaomi 6 has maximum clock speed of 2.45 GHz, flash memory of 64 GB with 6 GB RAM and operating under Android 9.0. The Intel i7 4770hq processor of cloud service provider has maximum clock speed of 3.4GHz operating under Windows 7 OS with 16 GB RAM. All the cryptographic operations are implemented in C language under specific IDE and specific C/C++ Library (MIRACL).
According to Tseng et al. [3] and Roy et al. [7] , some notations are defined as follows: Table 7 , we tabulate and compare the computation overhead of the proposed scheme with the relevant schemes [2] , [3] , [7] . For all the given schemes, we separately tabulated computation for user U i and cloud service provider CSP j under Xiaomi 6 mobile phone and intel i7 4770hq computer, respectively. Also, we mention the underlying cryptographic operations for each relevant scheme in comparison. We study that the total user side computation overhead of the proposed scheme in login, authentication and key agreement phases is 3 M +4 T H + T FE + T X + T A . According to the test, the average execution time of U i is then approximately 16 ms. On the other hand, the cloud service provider CSP j has a computation overhead of 4T M +3T H +4T A +T X . The average execution time in i7 4770hq server is 6ms. In Figure 5 , we simulated a large number of users accessing mobile cloud services and recorded the time spent on 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000 users, respectively, without communication delay, which are 1.82s, 3.37s, 4.83s, 6.97s, 8.09s.. Compare with [2] , [3] scheme, the proposed scheme saves half of time consumption, and for Roy's lightweight scheme, it also does not add a lot of computational overhead.
In table 8 , we tabulate and compare the communication overheads of the proposed scheme with the relevant schemes [2] , [3] , [7] . For communication overhead, we concern the number of communication rounds. Our scheme needs three communication rounds in login, authentication and key agreement phases. In Figure 6 , we simulated a large number of users accessing mobile cloud services and recorded the time spent on 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000 users, respectively, which are 15.80s, 33.90s, 48.34s, 70.31s, and 84.09s. Compare with Fig 5, we found that for all schemes, the time delay caused by communication delay is much higher than the time loss caused by the cryptographic calculation. Therefore, in the future 5G communication environment, the applicability and practicality of our scheme will be greatly enhanced.
C. COMPARISON ON STORAGE COST
For storage cost, we tabulate and compare it of the proposed scheme with the relevant schemes [2] , [3] , [7] in table 8. Our scheme only requires users and cloud service providers to store one ZK-Token, and the registration center does not need to store any relevant information. However, the method that Roy does need registration center, cloud computing servers, and mobile terminal of users to store large numbers of credentials. In Figure 7 , we assure there are 250 mobile cloud users, 4 mobile cloud service providers, and one registration center or token service provider. In our scheme, all the users and cloud service provider only need to store one ZK-Token for them. In Roy's scheme, every user needs store four credentials, and every mobile cloud provider needs store 250 credentials for authentication. The registration center needs to store 4 × 250 = 1000 certificates for certificates revocation. With more users and cloud service providers joining in the system, the number of stored credentials for users and cloud service providers will grow linearly. However, the number of stored credentials for registration center will increase based the functionz = n × m, where n is the number of users in the system, m is the number of cloud service providers in the system, and z is the number of certificates that the registration center needs to store. It can be seen that the storage cost of our scheme is much smaller than that of Roy, and we can infer that our scheme has better scalability.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we propose an ID-MAKA scheme which firstly achieves biometrics-based remote authentication, single signon, and center-less for mobile cloud computing services. We have used the Real-Or-Random model and the BAN logic for formal security analysis, and also give an additional security analysis for other known attacks. The results show that our scheme is secure from well-known possible attacks. Besides, the high privacy of our schemes much protects users' sensitive data and personal information during the authentication process. Finally, by experimental data, we demonstrate that our scheme has low computational overhead and time consumption, which is suited for the mobile cloud users with low-power computing devices.
Future works: We are working on the methods of efficient token revocation and reduce the communication round. Even more, we also try to apply it to the Internet of Things.
